RAVI URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTORITY (RUDA):

ESSAY 

The Punjab government recently directed the Lahore Development Authority to lay the groundwork for establishing an independent Ravi Urban Development Authority (RUDA). Initially, the new government body was being planned under the aegis of the LDA, however, this plan was later scrapped. Reportedly, if the new authority is developed as an independent government entity, then it will have its own governing body and it will be responsible for establishing a new city along the Ravi riverfront. Previously, the RUDA was supposed to be similar to the WASA and the Traffic Engineering and Planning Agency. Now it will be a separate authority and the LDA has already been directed to prepare the paperwork for the purpose.

Sustainable development goals:

The unsustainability of the Project from an ecological, environmental and financial perspective argued by the Society seems to reflect a myopic view of the ever-changing and developing world, especially in view of the ever-increasing population of Lahore, a provincial capital. It is submitted that the Project has been conceived in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN). Under the 2030 Agenda of the UN, the economic, social and development dimensions of “sustainable development” are to be integrated in harmony. They are to be construed as a whole and not in a fragmented manner. One goal should not encroach upon other goals and if we examine SDG 17 (global partnerships and cross-sector collaboration), the Project aims to accomplish a majority of the goals listed under it by providing state-of-the-art infrastructure and facilities, sustainable communities, job opportunities and further healthcare and educational opportunities to its residents. Moreover, the Society’s argument with regard to the Project’s potential detrimental effects to the environment is also frail as the Project intends to plant vegetation around the current barren lands of River Ravi and help with its sanitization and treatment, which even the River Ravi Commission has, to date, been unsuccessful with.

Sustainable development is no doubt an evolving concept and it is noteworthy to mention that under our domestic law the Supreme Court of Pakistan has taken a pragmatic approach in its landmark judgment pertaining to an environmental issue

Ecosystem

The Project also claims to value the ecosystem of River Ravi and appears committed to legally resolving any environmental impediments for the betterment of its development. Moreover, its concept is not only in sync with the hortatory non-binding goals of the United Nations but is also supported by the doctrine of precedent of our Supreme Court.

The argument that the channelization of River Ravi is against the principles of sustainable development and ecological sustainability has little weight at this point. Whether or not any purported channelization of River Ravi will affect the ecology of the River is a question to be determined by the relevant experts and consultants in the field. Their recommendations in this regard shall be implemented in the execution of the Project. During the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) process, such reports should be presented to the concerned agencies for their approval under the Punjab Environment Protection Act 1997 (PEPA 1997).

Moreover, the Society’s argument that riverbanks are an integral part of the river ecosystem and the hydraulics of rivers where there is no defined edge should be maintained, is to be decided upon after comprehensive reports by the relevant experts and consultants in the field. During the EIA process, such reports will be presented to the concerned agencies for their approval under PEPA (Pakistan Environmental Protection Act).

The reality of River Ravi is that it is currently a “sewage nullah”, as quoted by the Prime Minister. The benefits of implementing the project outweigh the environmental concerns being stressed upon by the Society. Any environmental damage apprehended at this point is pure conjecture. A proper EIA should be carried out before the execution of the Project and all matters pertaining to the environment and ecology of River Ravi and its surrounding topography should be addressed through the proper medium, as per the regulatory laws of our land. The Project is essential for the sustainable development of Punjab and will save River Ravi from further damage.

Drawbacks of RUDA

The bulldozers came at the crack of dawn, and they came with no warning. As they rumbled through farmland with the watery September sun at their backs, they were accompanied by a small army of private guards and officials from the Ravi Urban Development Authority (RUDA). Tenants and landowners that farm the land watched on with resignation while their crops were destroyed, and waterways blocked. 

The Ravi Riverfront Project is many things. At its best, it is a vein, bloated, misguided attempt that many environmentalists and hydrological experts have called an impending ecological and social disaster. At its worst, it is an uncaring attempt to turn the Ravi and its embankments into a playground for real estate developers that intend to treat it as a cash-cow for at least the next two decades

For better or worse, it has become a bone of contention with political undertones. A pet project of former prime minister Imran Khan, it was declared illegal and unconstitutional by the Lahore High Court last year and has recently been given reprieve by the Supreme Court. That verdict in addition to the PTI back in charge in Punjab may be what is behind the latest attempt by RUDA to seize lands that they claim they have legally acquired and which the owners of these lands say have not been.

CONCLUSION:

WHY NATIONS FAIL By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (CHAPTER 5)

"I'VE SEEN THE FUTURE AND IT WORKS":
GROWTH UNDER EXTRACTIVE INSTITUTIONS

In this chapter’s first section, “I’ve Seen the Future,” Acemoglu and Robinson note that most societies have had extractive economic and political institutions but have still managed to achieve some economic growth. However, this growth is based on existing technologies, while growth in inclusive societies is based on technological change.

Extractive political and economic institutions are designed to benefit the elite class that holds power in society. These institutions do not benefit the majority of citizens (who are better served by inclusive institutions). Specifically, extractive political institutions give the elite a monopoly on power by excluding the majority of society from government. In turn, the elite class uses these political institutions to create and sustain extractive economic institutions that enrich its members. These extractive economic institutions are harmful to the majority of society: they impoverish it, restrict its economic rights, and limit its opportunities.

Like most economists, Acemoglu and Robinson believe that free, open markets are the most efficient way to allocate limited resources because they allow everyone to pursue and fulfill their individual preferences. In contrast, while centrally planned economies can excel in certain sectors, they can’t meet the economy’s overall needs. However, unlike many economists, the authors also emphasize that building effective markets doesn’t mean keeping the government out of the economy instead, governments actually have to create free markets through economic institutions that give people the means to innovate and invest.

The authors repeat that inclusive institutions create economies based on innovation, which grow because the people who participate in them have incentives to succeed. In other words, the engine of growth is within the economy itself, which is why this growth is sustainable. On the other hand, extractive institutions create economies based on compulsion, which only grow because elites reshape them.

The Soviet Union understood the importance of innovation and took many steps to spur it along, but these attempts failed. Because Stalin’s whims controlled the economy, the authors suggest, citizens expected instability in the Soviet Union’s economic future. As a result, they couldn’t trust that their investments would be safe or that they’d be rewarded for their efforts or innovations. In fact, the authors argue that Stalin’s policies actually punished innovation and hampered creative destruction. This further supports the authors’ belief that extractive institutions are inherently hostile to innovation and stifle long-term economic growth.

The authors argue that only the free market can properly reward innovation and not government compensation schemes, which can’t even measure true innovation to begin with.

The Lele and Bushong provide a kind of natural experiment, much like North and South Korea or the two halves of Nogales. The only difference is that neither of them have inclusive institutions. Still, they share practically the same culture and geography, but neither of these factors can explain why the Bushong have a more prosperous economy.

The Kuba Kingdom shows that extractive institutions still produce more growth than no institutions at all. While extractive institutions don’t incentivize growth in general, they do give elites an incentive to increase growth as long as that growth doesn’t interfere with their power. After all, the more surplus there is, the more elites can extract and keep for themselves. Shyaam’s policies exemplify this: he restructured society so that the people he ruled would make more of what he wanted. Even though his kingdom collapsed, it left a lasting legacy among the Bushong.

In extractive societies, Acemoglu and Robinson repeatedly argue, power is the primary road to wealth and status, so leaders tend to be overly preoccupied with increasing and protecting their power. The archaeological record suggests that Maya leaders focused all their energy on war (and none of it on innovation), which is clearly consistent with the authors’ theory.

The authors link together all of the conclusions that they have reached in this chapter so far. Extractive institutions can create a very specific, limited form of economic progress. In particular, they are very effective at uniting disorganized peoples and territories, then directing them toward the goals of a single ruler or small group of elites. This explains why all of the earliest complex societies were extractive and gave rulers nearly unfettered power. But it also explains why most of them were eventually overthrown by other extractive institutions. 

WHY NATIONS FAIL By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (CHAPTER 4)

SMALL DIFFERENCES AND CRITICAL JUNCTURES: THE WEIGHT OF HISTORY

THE WORLD THE PLAGUE CREATED

In this chapter, the author tries to explain why different countries build different kinds of institutions in the first place. The Black Death exemplifies one of their key principles: institutions tend to change during crises, because institutions have to adapt and respond to them. Specifically, in England the Black Death tipped the scales in the ongoing conflict between the elites and the masses. By redistributing power, the Black Death made it possible for the people to create more inclusive institutions.

The differences between England and Eastern Europe underline a second important principle about historical change: not every nation will respond to the same crisis (or critical juncture) in the same way. In fact, nations often diverge over time precisely because their institutions respond to the same critical stages in different ways. While the Black Death tipped the balance of power toward the masses in England, it did the opposite in Eastern Europe. Notably, this happened because England was slightly more inclusive and less extractive than Eastern Europe before the Black Death. In other words, the Black Death multiplied existing institutional differences, leading to a major divergence.

“Institutional drift” the differences between nations that accumulate over time doesn’t always lead to transformation. Rather, it only truly matters when those nations hit a critical juncture. But when they do, institutions transform. This is Acemoglu and Robinson’s explanation for why different nations have diverged over time. In particular, it explains how nations can make the leap from extractive to inclusive institutions. Virtually all nations start with extractive institutions run by and for a small elite, but at critical junctures, the pluralistic and democratic elements in those countries can sometimes overthrow extractive institutions and replace them with inclusive ones.

Contingency really just means that things could have been otherwise history didn’t have to go the way it did. Contingency is important because it’s empowering: it suggests that people’s actions and decisions often do change the course of history. By emphasizing the contingency of history, Acemoglu and Robinson emphasize that nations can overcome poverty if their people and leaders make the right choices and overthrow extractive institutions. In contrast to Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory, which acknowledges contingency, the geography and culture hypotheses suggest that the root cause of poverty is some inherent factor that’s outside of people’s control. They thus imply that people don’t have the power to reform and improve their own countries.

The idea of contingency suggests that, depending on the behaviour of key actors, the same crisis in the same nation could make institutions either far more inclusive or far more extractive. Clearly, people shouldn’t court crisis in the hopes of building more inclusive institutions, since inclusiveness depends on a lot more than simply experiencing a critical juncture.

Acemoglu and Robinson attribute sub-Saharan Africa’s poverty to a series of patterns that have kept its institutions highly extractive over time. The slave trade, colonialism, and modern dictatorships all stopped both centralization and pluralism—which are the two key factors for inclusive political institutions. But the authors point out that these different phases of sub-Saharan African history weren’t completely random or separate: rather, they were possible mainly because institutions were already extractive. In other words, the slave trade made it easier for Europeans to colonize sub-Saharan Africa, and this colonialism made it easier for independent African leaders to maintain extractive institutions. Thus, sub-Saharan Africa hasn’t just been unlucky: rather, it has been stuck in a cycle of extractive institutions.

Ottoman and European colonialism impoverished the Middle East by creating extractive institutions, like insecure property rights and unsurpassable barriers to entry in every major industry. This stifled innovation and kept Middle Eastern economies frozen in time. Like in Africa and Latin America, then, successive governments maintained the same extractive institutions over time, keeping the region in a cycle of poverty. It's no coincidence that these extractive institutions determine how oil wealth gets distributed nearly all of it goes to the elite.

WHY NATIONS FAIL By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (CHAPTER 3)

 

THE MAKING OF PROSPERITY AND POWER

THE ECONOMICS OF THE 38^TH PARALLEL

Chapter three starts by telling us how economics in North Korea and South Korea were and the living standards of the citizens of both sides of the 38th parallel, Here discusses the story of two brothers one is in north and other is in south side of Korea, the brother lives in south side his life expectancy is more than his brother live in north Korea. Because in north Korea the citizens have no property rights, political rights and no proper institutions.

The reason of the difference between two parallels is the elite and ruling class of the north don’t want to give power to their citizens to become prosperous and involved in the matters of the states. They just want to rule as this is an example to explain the logic of why economic prosperity is persistently rare under extractive economic and political institutions. After independence, the Congo was not able to develop because of the interests to extract income and sustain the power of the ruling elite and the King. Citizens were impoverished while the elite and the King were becoming continuously wealthy, therefore, supporting extractive economic and political institutions. If they had opted for inclusive economic and political institutions, the King and the elite would have not been as rich and as powerful, which was not on their interest.

 DIGITAL DIVIDE:

Digital inequality is evident between communities living in urban areas and those living in rural settlements; between socioeconomic groups; between less economically developed countries and more economically developed countries; between the educated and uneducated population. Individuals with access to a broadband connection can be digitally split. How? Low-performance computers limited broadband speeds and limited access to subscription-based content widen the gap.

IS PAKISTAN FACED DIGITAL DIVIDE:

YES, in Pakistan digital divide impact on different social and economic areas but education badly affected

In Pakistan, where over 300,000 schools have been closed since March due to the coronavirus outbreak, there were some schools which just continue their studies due to digital platforms and applications. But for millions of other Pakistani students, the fundamentals of connected life – smartphones and the internet – remain out of reach.

REASONS OF THE DIGITAL DIVIDE IN EDUCATION  

•   Financial barrier
•   Geographical barrier

 Reason 1

Technology and internet are expensive!

Those from more affluent backgrounds have better and easier access to it.

It is becoming increasingly important to be digitally savvy in order to succeed in today’s society

Reason 2

Technology and internet access also differs in regards to geographical area.

A digital divide exists between those living in rural and urban areas.

Although their insufficient differences between the use of internet for urban and rural areas, broadband in rural areas is significantly slower.

One of the biggest challenges in Pakistan is fill the gap of digital divide.

WHY NATIONS FAIL By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (CHAPTER 2)

 

THEORIES THAT DON’T WORK

The lay of the land:

There are three main takeaways from this chapter.

1 To understand world inequality, we have to understand why some societies are organized in very inefficient and socially undesirable ways.

2 Poor countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose as the that England in the nineteenth century was also a very unhealthy place, but they tried to change their condition not to stuck on those problems. Now England is the richest country of the United Kingdom.

3 Achieving prosperity depends on solving some basic political problems.it is undeniable that political decisions, from the highest level down to the local level, has much more significant impact on economy and society than even 100% discipline from all people i.e., it doesn't matter if all people follow the rules if the rules themselves only enrich a very small fraction of the population, every will most likely stay in poverty and worsening conditions.